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I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 is the most innovative and
far-reaching federal civil rights legislation--ever--on behalf of disabled
persons. Its purpose is nothing less than "a national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring those
individuals into the economic and social mainstream of American life."3 It
provides basically the same bundle of protections for the disabled as the Civil
Rights Acts of the 1960's did for citizens of color.4 Through the ADA, Congress
1Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University, 1966; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1969.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Hofstra Law School Disability
Rights Conference, November 1992. The author wishes to thank Rose DiBenedetto, Ilene
Sacco and Monica Studdert for their helpful research assistance, and Debbie Dorfman,
Keri Gould and Ellen Saideman for their helpful comments and suggestions.
242 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1990). See generally, 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1989) § 6.44A at 111-31 (Supp. 1994).
3 HousE COMMrrEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 485,101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 4, at 25 (1990).
4For a comprehensive overview, see Bonnie P. Tucker, The Anericans With
Disabilities Act of1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. REV. 13 (1992); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY § 2.39 (1994), at 321-25.
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provides clear, strong, enforceable standards, and ensures that the federal
government plays a central role in the enforcement of those standards. 5
The language that Congress chose to use in its introductory fact-findings is
of extraordinary importance. Its specific finding that individuals with
disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority ... subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness" 6 is not just precatory flag-and-apple-pie rhetoric.7 This
language was carefully chosen. It comes from the heralded "footnote 4" of the
United States v. Carolene Products case.8 This decision has served as the
springboard, for nearly a half century, for challenges to state and municipal
laws that have operated in discriminatory ways against other minorities, and
reflects a Congressional commitment to provide "protected class"
categorization for disabled persons.
As a result, this in turn forces courts to employ a "compelling state interest"
or "strict scrutiny" test in considering statutory and regulatory challenges to
allegedly discriminatory treatment.9 The law's invocation of the "full sweep of
5 See, e.g., 22 N.M. L. REv. at 43-48, 63-64, 93-95, 101-02 (discussing enforcement
provisions). Cf. Stephan Haimowitz, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Its
Significancefor Persons With Mental Illness, 42 Hosp. & COMMuN. PSYCHIATRY 23,23 (1991)
(discussing how important provisions of the ADA were "compromisedto secure
enactment").
642 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1990).
7Compare Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,11 (1981) (holding
that "rights language" in Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6010-6012 (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6009 (1990)), simply created
a federal-state granting statute and did not vest individuals who are developmentally
disabled with a legally enforceable cause of action). This conclusion was criticized as
"absurd" and "objectionable" in an article co-authored by plaintiffs' lead counsel in the
Pennhurst case. David Ferleger & Edward Scott, Rights and Dignity: Congress, The
Supreme Court and People With Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 327,
350 (1983). For a survey of all commentary, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 7.13 at 617-23.
8 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). I discuss
the impact of this footnote on the development of mental disability law in Michael L.
Perlin, On "Sanism" 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 380-81 n.51 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism],
and in 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 1.03 at 6. See also M. Greg Bloche & Francine Cournos,
Mental Health Policy for the 1990's: Tinkering in the Interstices, 15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L. 387,389 (1990) (limited social skills of chronically mentally ill "render them uniquely
ineffective as political actors in the struggle for social resources").
91n City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985), the
Supreme Court ruled that mental retardation was neither a suspect class nor a
quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. In supporting its
conclusion, it noted that a contrary decision would have made it difficult to distinguish
other groups such as the mentally ill "who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting
them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses,
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large."
Id. at 445. See also Shweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,231-34 (1981) (employing rational
basis test in challenge to statute reducing Supplemental Security Income benefits to
certain individuals in institutions for mental illness); Adoption of Kay C., 278 Cal. Rptr.
907, 914-15 (Cal. App. 1991) (reaching conclusion similar to Cleburne on state
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congressional authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment,"1 0 simply means that any violation of the ADA must be read in
the same light as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution.
This guarantees, for the first time, that this core constitutional protection will
finally be made available to disabled persons.11
The ADA repudiates the notion that the disabled can be treated as
second-class citizens. The concept of "separate but equal" is no more acceptable
here than it is in cases involving people of color.12 The congressional history
constitutional law grounds). Cleburne is discussed in this context in 2 PERLIN, supra note
2, § 7.22 at 162-63 n.550; see generally, Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home:
Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111 (1987); Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 398-407 (1991); James Ellis, On the
'Usefulness' of Suspect Classification, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 375 (Summer 1986). For a
more recent analysis of suspect classification jurisprudence in institutional benefit
funding cases, see Susan M. Jennen, Note, The IMD Exclusion: A Discriminatory Denial
of Medicaid Funding for Non-Elderly Adults in Institutions for Mental Disease, 17 WM.
MUITCHELL L. REV. 339 (1991).
The Supreme Court recently affirmed the status of Cleburne as a rational basis case
in Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2643 (1993), holding that a state statutory scheme that
established a heightened standard of review for involuntary commitment based on
mental illness (beyond a reasonable doubt) but a lesser standard for commitment based
on mental retardation (dear and convincing evidence) did not violate the equal
protection clause ("We have applied rational basis review in previous cases involving
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill," citing, interalia, Cleburne). But see id. at 2652
(Souter,J., dissenting) (failure of court to applyCleburneso as to invalidate statute leaves
Cleburne's status "unclear").
1042 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1990).
11 See, e.g., Cook, supra note 9, at 434 ("[Congressional] findings indicate
unambiguously that Congress considered disability classifications to be just as serious
and just as impermissible as racial categorizations that are given 'strict' or 'heightened'
scrutiny, sustainable by the courts only if they are tailored to serve a 'compelling'
governmental interest.") But see Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91SC189, 1992 WL 77908
(Colo. April 20,1992) (en banc), reh'g denied, 843 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 918(1994) (declining to applyADA to claim that mental illness is suspect class, where
Act not in effect at time of trial).
Intermediate scrutiny was applied to mental illness two years prior to the Cleburne
decision in J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F. 2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1983); see also, Thomas
Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 112 (1990)
(arguing that mental illness and mental retardation should both be treated as suspect
classes); but see Michael Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Disabled, 74
GEO. L.J. 1435,1486 (1986) (classic equal protection analysis methodology unsuitable for
ca ses involving disabled persons). For a recent critical consideration of traditional equal
protection analysis in race cases, see Donald Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection:
The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307 (1991).
12 See, e.g., Pete V. Domenici, Preface: Special Law Review Issue on the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992); Cook, supra note 9, at 423-24.
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reveals a specific intent to end segregation of disabled individuals in a wide
variety of community and institutional settings.13
The ADA has been hailed by advocates for the disabled as a "breathtaking
promise for people with... disabilities,"14 as "the most important civil rights
act passed since 1964,"15 and as the "Emancipation Proclamation for those with
disabilities."16 Contrarily, it has been criticized by business and industry
spokespeople as "a nightmare for employers."17 Other analyses focus on its
impact on traditional labor relationships between union and management 18
and on its potential to become a "full employment act for lawyers."19 Early case
law, although sparse, suggests that some courts are taking the ADA seriously
and are applying it in ways Congress apparently intended it to be applied.20
13 See Cook, supra note 9, at 423-24 (quoting statements by, inter alia, Sen. Weicker,
Sen. Kennedy and Rep. Collins). See also, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No.
485,101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 56, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,479 ('Integration
is fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision of segregated accommodations
and services relegate persons with disabilities to second-class citizen status.").
14 Bonnie Milstein, Leonard Rubenstein & Renee Cyr, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: A Breathtaking Promise for Persons With Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1240 (1991).
15KentJenkins, Spotlight Finds Hoyer, WASHINGTON Posi, May 28, 1990, at D1, col. 5,
as cited in Kimberly Ackourey, Insuring Americans With Disabilities: How Far Can
Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices? 40 EMORY L.J. 1183,1183 n.1 (1991).
16 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Summary and Analysis, Special
Supplement (BNA), at S-5, as cited in Ackourey, supra note 15, at 1183 n.2 (statement by
bill's sponsors), and Tuckersupra note 4, at 16 n.4 (same); 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 6.44A
at 111 (Supp. 1994) (ADA stands as Congress's "most innovative attempt to address the
pervasive problem of discrimination against mentally and physically handicapped
citizens"); Sandra Law, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Burden on Business or
Dignity for the Disabled? 30 DUQ. L. REV. 99 (1991) (ADA a "solid and positive step toward
making this country a better nation").
17Thomas Barnard, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and
DreamsforLawyers, 64 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 229,231 (1990). See also Lawrence Postol & David
Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans With Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications
to Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 726 (1991) ("many managers
would laugh at the suggestion [that the ADA requires them to provide certain
reasonable accommodations to disabled workers]").
18See, e.g., G. William Davenport, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of
the Major Employment-Related Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 ALA. L. REV. 307, 335
(1992) (union attorneys now fear that employers will use the ADA as an offensive
weapon to weaken labor organizations by attacking traditional job structures defined
in typical labor contracts).
19John Parry, The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 14 MENT. & PHYS. DIS. L.
RFTR. 292, 298 (1990). Six Major Areas of Litigation Predicted for the 1990's, 6 INSIDE LIrIG.
32, No. 3, at *7 (WESTLAW pagination) (March 1992) (the ADA may give "biggest boost
to disabled plaintiffs .... [Llawsuits brought on behalf of handicapped plaintiffs are
already very difficult for defendants to win on summary judgment.").
20 E.g., Ellen S. v. Florid Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(inquiries of bar applicants as to prior mental health treatment violates ADA) (but see
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And yet, some storm clouds darken the sky. At least three separate (but
overlapping) concerns temper my ultimate enthusiasm about the ADA as a
significant civil rights enforcement tool for mentally ill individuals (those
currently institutionalized, those formerly institutionalized, and those who
have never had any contact with institutional systems). First, a reading of the
legislative history, the early commentaries and even the practice manuals
barely acknowledge the application of the ADA to persons with a mental
disability.21 Of the scant attention paid to the mentally ill in the ADA legislative
debate, most focused on an ultimately unsuccessful attempt led by Senator
Helms to jettison most mentally ill persons from the Act's protections.22 While
this attempt was ultimately unsuccessful (and its failure may actually prove to
be a weapon in the arsenal of advocates litigating on behalf of the mentally
ill),23 the tenor of the debate serves as a paradigm for my ultimate concern
about the Act's prophylactic value.
contra, Applicants v. Texas St. Bd. of Bar Examiners (W.D. Tex., Oct. 10,1994) (rejecting
similar challenges) (unpublished opinion on file with Author); Anderson v. Little
League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992) (granting physically disabled
plaintiff, a wheelchair user, a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants from
preventing him from serving as field coach in baseball game); Chatoff v. City of New
York, No. 92 Civ. 0604 (RWS), 1992 WL 202441 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992) (ordering
permanent injunction compelling defendant City to make "911 emergency services"
directly accessible to hearing impaired and speech impaired individuals, relying, in
part, on "discrete and insular minority"language); cf Duc Van Le v. Ibarra, No. 91SC189,
1992 WL 77908 (Colo. April 20, 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 918 (1994). For
more recent cases, see 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 6.44A at 129-31 nn. 473.43a-473.43i (Supp.
1994).
2 1 The Act specifically defines disability as:
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. IV
1992) (emphasis added). While mental disability is the focus of several commentaries
on the ADA, see Cook, supra note 9; Milstein, Rubenstein & Cyr, supra note 14;
Haimowitz, supra note 5; Parry, supra note 19; Laura Mancuso, Reasonable
Accommodations for Workers With Psychiatric Disabilities, 14 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J. 3
(1990), it is barely mentioned in much of the law review scholarship. See, e.g., James
Zappa, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Improving Judicial Determination of
Whether an Individual is "Substantially Limited" 75 MxIN. L. REv. 1303 (1991); Philip L.
Gordon, The Job Application Process After the Americans With Disabilities Act, 18 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 185 (Autumn 1992); D. Todd Amey, Note, Survey of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, Title I: With the Final Regulations In, Are the Criticisms Out? 31 WASHBURN
L.J. 522 (1992); Davenport, supra note 18; Bamard, supra note 17; Postel & Kadue, supra
note 17; Ackourey, supra note 15. For additional recent references, see 2 PERLIN, supra
note 2, § 6.44A, at 118-19 n. 473.24b (Supp. 1994).
22 See 112 CoNG. REC. S10,765-97 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 71-78. The implications of this attempt are discussed in Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413 (1991).
23 The defeat of this effort should be a persuasive counter response to an anticipated
argument that Congress failed to understand the implications of its actions when it
1993-941
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Second, when commentators have considered the application of the ADA to
persons with a mental disability, they have generally limited their analysis to
the status of mentally retarded persons, not to persons with mental illness.24 For
example, consumer groups-a vital force in the community of persons
formerly institutionalized because of mental illness (or perceived mental
illness)-are virtually unmentioned in the ADA literature. 25 Even within the
disability community, persons with mental illness are often the poor stepchild,
and remain the last hidden minority.26
Third, and most important, no matter how strongly a civil rights act is
written nor how clearly its mandate is articulated, the aims of such a law cannot
be met unless there is a concomitant change in public attitudes.27 This is the
expanded the bill's coverage to mentally ill persons. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485 (IV),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1990, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 512, dissenting views
of Reps. Dannemeyer, Barton & Ritter ("It is our sincere hope that the ADA does not
become a shield for mentally unstable individuals such as the Louisville mass
murderer').
24See, e.g., Cook, supra note 9; but see Peter Cubra, Discrimination of People With
Disabilities and Their Federal Rights-Still Waiting After All These Years, 22 N.M. L. REV.
277 (1992) (discussing institutional litigation on behalf of mentally ill persons); cf.
Richard B. Simring, Note, The Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws on Housing for
People With Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413 (January 1991) (discussing
sterotypic perceptions of mentally ill persons).
25The role of consumer groups in shaping mental health law policy is discussed
carefully in Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law Reform,
Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25
(Spring 1992), and in Neal Milner, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Four Case Studies of Legal
Mobilization, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 447 (1987). For an important ex-patient's perspective,
see JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1979). On the significance of the alternative perspective of
groups dominated by patients' and ex-patients' relatives, see Joel F. Handler,
"Constructing the Political Spectacle': The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and
Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 969 (1990).
26 See generally Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and
the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 47 (1993). Even
supportive commentaries about the ADA that attempt to contextualize it with other
disability focused federal civil rights legislation fail to articulate the important potential
link between the ADA and the Protection and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Individuals
Act (PAMI), see 42 U.S.C. § 10801-10851 (Supp. IV 1992). See, e.g., Dick Thomburgh, The
Americans With Disabilities Act: What It Means To All Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 375
(1991); Jane West, The Social Policy Context of the Act, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 3 (Jane West ed., 1991). But see Margulies, supra note 25,
at 57 n.132 (on the need for persons with physical disabilities and mental disabilities to
form political coalitions); citing SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE
RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 47-51 (1984) (discussing difficulties of uniting disparate
groups of persons with disabilities); see also, Wendy E. Parmet, The Americans With
Disabilities Act: From Policy To Practice 3 (Jane West ed., 1991) (book review), 17J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 583,584 (1992) (noting the reviewed book's lack of separate treatment
of mental health policy).
27 The significance of attitudinal barriers in this context are explicitly recognized in
Thornburgh, supra note 26, at 377, and in Amey, supra note 21, at 529. On the question
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"wild card" that will inevitably help determine the ultimate "real life" impact
of the ADA.
This leads to my thesis. What I call "sanist" attitudes and "pretextual" judicial
and legislative reactions dominate social and legal discourse about mentally ill
persons (and those so perceived). 28 These attitudes affect and infect
interpersonal relationships, social, cultural and political actions, judicial
decisions, legislative enactments, scholarly writings, administrative rulings,
and litigation strategies. 29 They largely operate on an unconscious (and often
invisible) level, and are frequently found in the writings and public
pronouncements of otherwise "liberal" or "progressive" individuals.30 They are
also rationalized through the non-reflective use of a false kind of "ordinary
common sense" (OCS)31 and through the use of distortive cognitive simplifying
devices (heuristics).3 2 Courts and legislatures often respond to these sanist
attitudes by condoning (or encouraging) pretextuality in both civil and
of attitudinal barriers in other civil rights areas, see generally Rebell, supra note 11; see
also Haimowitz, supra note 5, at 23:
While the [ADA] is no more likely to completely eliminate the myths,
fears, and discrimination faced by person with disabilities than earlier
civil rights law eliminated discrimination based on race, the new
legislation will nonetheless contribute to the enormous educational
effort needed to combat widespread misinformation and stereotypes
about disabilities.
On the "strongly negative perceptions of workers with psychiatric disabilities," see
Mancuso, supra note 21, at 4 (citing sources).
28 See, e.g., Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 26; Michael L.
Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28
Hous. L. REV. 63,91-93 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Competency].
29 See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 398-406.
30 See, e.g., DAVID ROTHmAN & SHEILA ROTHMAN, THE WILLownooK WARS 188-89
(1984) (discussing role of paradigmatically liberal Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman
in attempting to block group homes for the mentally retarded from opening in her
district). On the question of attitudes about the sexuality of persons with mental
disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction:
Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 517, 545 (1993-94)
(questioning potential impact of ADA on these attitudes) [hereinafter Perlin, Sexual
Interaction].
31See Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common
Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin,
Psychodynamics]. This concept is considered most carefully in Richard K. Sherwin,
Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 729 (1988), and see id. at 737 (OCS exemplified by the attitude of "What I know
is 'self evident'; it is 'what everybody knows").
32 See generally Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 123 (1980-81). The use of these
devices frequently lead to systematically erroneous decisions through ignoring or
misusing rationally useful information. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A
Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
39, 57 n.115 (1992) [hereinafter, Perlin, FatalAssumption].
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criminal cases involving litigants with mental disabilities.33 Frequently the
misuse (and teleological application) of social science data is the vehicle
through which pretextual decisions serve to reify sanist attitudes34
If the ADA is to make any true headway in restructuring the way that citizens
with mental disabilities are dealt with by society (by employers, public
agencies, and proprietors of places of public accommodations) it must provide
a means by which to deal frontally with these sanist attitudes. Importantly, and
not coincidentally, most of the attention that has been paid so far to the ADA
considers questions of physicality: e.g., retrofitting busses, installing ramps,
restructuring buildings. 35 Little attention has been paid to questions of attitude
towards all disabled persons, less to questions of attitude regarding the
mentally disabled, and even less to questions of attitude regarding persons
with mental illness.36
The simple official repudiation of discriminatory practices is not enough to
significantly alter the distorted cognitive processes that still frequently
dominate our thinking and decision-making. There have been no attempts, so
far, to answer the question that has bedeviled civil rights activists since the
1950's: how to capture "the hearts and minds" 37 of the American public so as
to best insure that statutorily and judicially articulated rights are
incorporated-freely and willingly-into the day-to-day fabric and psyche of
society. Unless advocates turn their attention to these attitudinal questions, the
33 See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47
U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Michael L. Perlin, Morality &
Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and
Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin,
Morality].
34 See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 26. On the way that conservative
Senators attempted to distinguish the physically from the mentally disabled in their
efforts to narrow the Act's scope, see infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
35See, e.g., Irwin Shur, Title IIl of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Regulations
Regarding Modifications New Construction and Alteration of Facilities, 10 ACCA DOcKET 24
(Summer 1992); Frank Morris, Americans With Disabilities Act: Overview of the
Employment and Public Accommodations Provisions, C742 ALI-ABA 535 (1992); Brian Poll
& John Gose, The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Impacts on Tenants, Landlords,
and Lenders, C736 AU-ABA 179 (1992).
36But see sources cited supra note 27. On the value of sensitivity awareness training
in this context, see Marie Watts, Overcoming Biases: Disability Awareness Training, 55 TEx.
B.J. 840 (1992).
37The phrase was first used in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954); see also, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409,445 (1968); In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
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ADA may-in "real life"-tum out to be little more than the last in a long (and
depressing) series of "paper victories"38 for mentally ill individuals.
This paper is organized in the following way. First, I discuss those sections
of the ADA that have a potential impact on mentally ill individuals and look
briefly at the way mental illness issues have been dealt with in the legislative
debate. Next, I discuss the meaning of "sanism" and its role in the development
of mental disability law policy, and explain how much of our jurisprudence in
this area is pretextual. Then, I look at how the ADA "fits" into the pattern of
sanist behavior and pretextual judicial and legislative decision-making, and
argue that the ADA's ultimate impact on the lives of mentally ill persons will
be meager unless sanism and pretextuality are confronted directly. I conclude
with some modest recommendations to policy makers in this area and also look
briefly at some of the additional implications for scholars and academics
writing in this area. 39
II. THE ADA AND MENTAL ILLNESS
The Americans With Disabilities Act bars discrimination against those who
are mentally or physically disabled in a wide variety of public and private
settings.40 Discrimination in hiring, promotion and discharge is proscribed,
41
subject to limitations on "undue hardship,"42 and the application of qualifica-
38See Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND
HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976).
39 0n the importance of academic scholarship in the process of rebutting sanist
myths, see Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 406.
40See generally Tucker, supra note 4; Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities
Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923 [hereinafter Tucker, Overview]; Arlene
Mayerson, Title 1-Employment Provisions of theAmericans With Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP.
L. REV. 499 (1991); Nancy LeeJones, Overview and Essential Requirements of theAmericans
With Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471 (1991).
For a survey of prior federal legislation providing benefits or creating statutory
civil rights for persons with disabilities, see Kathlyn Reed, History of Federal Legislation
for Persons With Disabilities, 46 AM. J. OCCUPAT'L THER. 397 (1992). On the relationship
between the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see Jill Adams,
Judicial and Regulatory Interpretation of the Employment Rights of Persons With Disabilities,
22 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 28 (1991). See also, Note, Civil Rights and the Disabled:
A Comparison ofthe Rehabilitation Act of1973 and theAmericans With Disabilities Act of1990
in the Employment Setting, 54 ALB. L. REV. 123 (1989).
4142 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. IV 1992).
421d. § 12111(10); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1993). At least one commentator has urged that
this exception should be allowed in cases where accommodation "jeopardizes
employer-sponsored health care benefits." See Sondra Lopez-Aguado, The Americans
With Disabilities Act: The Undue Hardship Defense and Insurance Costs, 12 REV. LMG. 249,
253 (1992). See also, 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 6.44A, at 126-27 n.473.28 (citing sources)
(Supp. 1994).
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tion standards "consistent with business necessity 43 require that a disabled
person be able to perform a job's "essential functions" with "reasonable
accommodations," and without creating an "undue burden" on the employer. 4
Among the qualification standards is the requirement that the individual not
pose "a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace."45 Public entities are prohibited from discriminating against
disabled persons in matters involving participation, in, or the receipt of benefits
from, their programs or activities.46 Discrimination in a wide array of public
accommodations, including hotels, restaurants, parks, zoos and theaters, is
similarly prohibited. 47 By its terms, the entire ADA applies to persons with
mental disability, including mentally ill persons. Yet, very little of the final
statute, the legislative history, or floor debate focused on the "grotesque"
history of discrimination and mistreatment suffered by such individuals,4 8 the
crushing economic, social and psychological burdens borne by such persons
in their day-to-day lives; the conditions faced by such persons when
institutionalized in public facilities or when discharged from such facilities to
lives of misery on our cities' streets without adequate transitional mental
health, medical or social services; or the pernicious legal effects that flow from
the badge of mental disability.
The phrase "mental impairment" or "mental disability" is mentioned only a
handful of times in the final Act. In the initial findings section, Congress noted
that 43 million Americans "have one or more physical or mental disabilities";4 9
disability is defined to include a "physical or mental impairment;"50
discrimination includes failure to make "reasonable accommodation" to an
otherwise qualified person's "known physical or mental limitations,"51 and a
section on paratransit and special transportation services requires that public
entities provide such services to any individual who is unable, "as a result of a
physical or mental impairment" to use other public transportation vehicles. 52
The only other section of the ADA that looks specifically to mental disability is
4342 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
44Id. § 12111(8)-(10).
45Id. § 12113(b). On the significance of this language in this context, see infra text
accompanying and following note 143.
4642 U.S.C. § 12132.
47 d. § 12182(a), 12181(7).
48City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
generally, Cook, supra note 9, at 399-407.
4942 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
501d. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added).
511d. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
521d. § 12143(C)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
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an exclusion section which states that the Act is inapplicable to, inter alia, certain
sexual disorders5 3 and to compulsive gambling.54
The legislative history is similarly inadequate, and speaks to only two
relevant considerations. First, it reflects Congressional awareness of the
pernicious danger of stereotyping behavior. Congress makes this clear through
its heavy reliance on the Supreme Court's language in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arlines 5 that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability
and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment."56 Congress stressed that its inclusion in the definition of
disability of an individual who is regarded as being impaired 57 acknowledges
this teaching about the power of myths.58
Thus, employment decisions cannot be based on "paternalistic views" of
what is best for a person with a disability.5 9 The employment title of the ADA
was thus designed, in significant part, to prevent employers from relying on
presumptions, stereotypes, misconceptions and unfounded fears in making
employment decisions, 60 and as a means of breaking the chain of
misperception that disabled individuals are a "permanently helpless and
separate class, unable to work or otherwise contribute to society.61
Second, the history of the "direct threat" section-again relying on the Arline
case-specifies that, for persons with mental disabilities, the employer must
identify "the specific behavior on the part of the individual that would pose the
53 E.g., transvestism, transsexualism, and other "gender identity disorders," see 42
U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1).
54Id. § 12211(b)(2).
55480U.S. 273(1987) (individualwith tuberculosisa 'handicapped individual" under
29 U.S.C. § 794 (§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973)).
561d. at 284.
57See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
58 H.R. REP. No. 485 (I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 335; see also id. at 305, 327.
591d. at 356.
601d. at 311 (discrimination against disabled persons "often results from false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance,
irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies").
61Elizabeth C. Morin, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration
Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189, 189, 212 (1990). On employers' myths in
this context, see Peter D. Blanck, Empirical Study of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans With Disabilities Act: Methods, Preliminary Findings, and Implications, 22 N.M.
L. REV. 119,129 (1992); and seegenerally, Peter Blanck, The Emerging WorkForce: Empirical
Study of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 16 J. CoRP. L. 693 (1991) [hereinafter Blanck,
Work Force] (describing 10 common myths and misconceptions). On the significance of
"misinformed stereotypes" generally, see W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions
Limitation on the Civil Rights of People With Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of Social
Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295, 317 (1992).
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anticipated direct threat," and that the determination must be based on such
behavior, "not merely on generalizations about the disability."62 The
determination must be based on "objective evidence ... that the person has a
recent history of committing overt acts or making threats which caused harm
or which directly threatened harm."63 While these two excerpts are
praiseworthy and important, that is all that is provided. Nowhere else in any
of the lengthy Congressional reports are the specific biases and prejudices faced
by mentally ill persons--that I call "sanism"-discussed. Although there is
recognition that much of the discrimination faced by disabled persons flows
from "unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions and deeply
imbedded prejudices,"64 the legislative history in no way illuminates the
specific prejudices and biases faced by persons with mental disabilities. This is
especially so as to the formerly institutionalized mentally ill.65
Persons with mental disabilities have been the object of this discrimination
for years. Surveys show that mental disabilities are the most negatively
perceived of all disabilities.66 Individuals with mental disabilities have been
denied jobs, refused access to apartments in public housing or entry to places
in public accommodation, and turned down for participation in publicly-
6 2 H.R. REP. No. 485 (11), supra note 58, at 56-57, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
338-39. See also, Cheryl D. Fells, Employee Benefit Plan Implications of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 714 PL/Corp 117,1990 WL 546: 'The determination that an individual
with a disabilitywill pose a safety threat to others mustbe made on a case-by-case basis
and must not be based on generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears,
patronizing attitudes, or pernicious mythologies"); Renee Cyr, The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Implications fir Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible
Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1237,1273 (1992) ("[gleneralized fear about risks from the
employment environment ... cannot be used by an employer to disqualify a person
with a disability").
63 H.R. REP. No. 485 (111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445,468-69. This language closely parallels that of the Fair Housing Act Amendments
of 1988, under which an otherwise qualified disabled person can be excluded from the
definition of handicap only where a landlord can establish that the individual's tenancy
would be a "direct threat" to others based upon a history of overt acts or current conduct.
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d) (1993). To trigger this section, the legislative history stressed
that "there must be objective evidence from the person's prior behavior that the person
has committed overt acts which caused harm or which directly threatened harm." H.R.
REP. No. 711,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2190,
as discussed in Simring, supra note 24, at 441.
6 4 H.R. REP. No. 485 (111), supra note 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 447-48.
6 5 0n the way that these negative stereotypes affect our homelessness policies, see
Perlin, supra Competency, note 8; Pedro J. Greer, Jr., Medical Problems of the Homeless:
Consequences of Lack of Social Policy-A Local Approach 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 407 (1990-91).
6 6 West, supra note 26, at 9, citing A.J. ARANGIO, BEHIND THE STIGMA OF EPILEPSY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE CENTURIES-OLD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH EPILEPSY
(1975). See also infra text accompanying note 75 (comments of Senator Helms in floor
debate on ADA).
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funded programs because they appear "strange" or "different."67 A series of
behavioral myths has emerged suggesting that persons with mental disabilities
are deviant, worth less than "normal" individuals, disproportionately
dangerous, and presumptively incompetent. 68 Yet, putting aside the two
exceptions just discussed, nothing in the ADA speaks directly to these myths or
to the special problems faced by persons with mental disabilities in attempting
to combat them.69
Ironically, the only time that mental disability issues were clearly the focal
point of an ADA debate came when a group of Senators led by Jesse Helms
sought to exclude specified mental disabilities, including schizophrenia and
manic-depression, from the ADA's coverage.70 Professor Robert Burgdorf
described a portion of the debate this way:
At one point, Senator Armstrong stood on the Senate floor and pointed
to a long list of conditions in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association as an
example of all the conditions included. His remarks raised the specter
of a potential roll call on individual amendments to remove each of
these conditions.
Attacks upon certain conditions provoked a strong response from
other Senators... Senator Domenici gave a spirited speech on behalf
of individuals with manic-depression and schizophrenia, suggesting
67Simring, supra note 24, at 422. See also, Cook, supra note 9, at 399-414, 424.
Particularly cruel examples are listed in Tucker, supra note 4, at 16-17.
68 See, e.g., Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 393-97, citing, inter alia, SANDER L. GILMAN,
DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985);
Stevenj. Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons
With Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 651, 681 (1989-90); Michael
L.Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693-96 (1989-90) [hereinafter Perlin, Unpacking]; Linda A.
Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous Misconception, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 593, 597-98 (1985); Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Mentally Ill and
Non-Mentally-Ill Patients' Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for
Medication, 15 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 377,385-86 (1991). On the way that misperceptions
of the relationship between dangerousness and mental illness negatively affects
parental termination decisions, see Paul Bernstein, Termination of Parental Rights on the
Basis of Mental Disability: A Problem in Policy and Interpretation, 22 PAC. LJ. 1155, 1169
(1991).
69 0n the way that public perceptions of mental illness and the accompanying stigma
perpetuate inadequate treatment of the mentally ill, see generally Wayne Ramage, The
Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. REV. 951 (1992).
7OAccording to the National Institutes of Mental Health, 2% of the population suffers
from schizophrenia, and .4% from manic depression. It has been estimated that 60
million American adults will experience some sort of mental disorder prior to their 65th
birthday and that 15 million of these will experience one of three types of severe mental
illness (schizophrenia, manic-depression, or major depression). See Blanck, Work Force,
supra note 61, n.48; Milt Freudenheim, New Law to Bring Wider Job Rightsfor Mentally Ill,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23,1991), at IA.
1993-94]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
that Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln suffered from such
disturbances. Other conditions did not have the advantage of such
Senatorial advocacy.
71
These amendments were ultimately defeated.7 2 However, other
amendments that excluded from the Act's coverage a wide range of gender
identity disorders (including transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism and voyeurism), compulsive gambling, kleptomania and
pyromania, and psychoactive drug use disorders were successfully passed. 73
The debate is illuminating. As Professor Burgdorf notes, several Senators
spoke eloquently about the role of the ADA in "breaking down those barriers
of [unfounded] fear and prejudices" and in "eliminat[ing] the automatic stigma"
attached to mental illness. 74 Others, though, reflected the depth and malignity
of their bias. In his colloquy with Senator Harkin about hiring practices, Senator
Helms asked, "How is an employer ... supposed to find out whether a man is
a pedophile or a schizophrenic?"75 He also asked whether an "employer's own
moral standards" enabled him to make hiring judgments about transvestites,
kleptomaniacs, or manic depressives.76 Interestingly and revealingly, he made
it clear that his attack was not meant to cover persons with physical disabilities:
"If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair or those who had been
injured in the war, that is one thing."77
This debate and its ultimate denouement may turn out to be a double-edged
sword. On one hand, the exclusions appear to reflect little more than members
of Congress' "own negative reactions, fears and prejudices 78 in a spirit
completely inconsistent with the ADA's overall spirit that encourages
"individualized determinations of actual ability and not preconceived
assumptions and stereotypes."79 On the other, the specific repudiation of
71Burgdorf, supra note 22, at 451-52 (citations omitted).
72 See 135 CONG. REC. S10,765-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
73 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211(b).
74 See 135 CoNG. REC. $10,767-86 (daily ed. Sept. 7,1989), (statement of Sen. Harkin);
Id. at S10,779 (statements of Sen. Domenici).
75 d. at S10,766 (statements of Sen. Helms) (emphasis added).
76 d. at S10,765 (emphasis added).
77135 CoNG. REC. S10,768. See also id. at S10,783 (statements of Sen. Humphrey):
"[Wie are not simply talking about the blind, the deaf, or persons confined to
wheelchairs."
78Burgdorf, supra note 22, at 519.
791d. at 452. Professor Burgdorf, nevertheless, has substantial concern about the total
impact of the Act.
For while the ADA represents a huge advance for people with
disabilities, those of us who have worked on the bill will continue to
cringe when a focus on provisions of the Act that exclude from pro-
tection those individuals having real and difficult psychological and
psychiatric disorders such as compulsive gambling, kleptomania
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Helms' attempt to gut the bill's coverage of individuals with some of the most
serious mental disabilities-persons who are schizophrenic and/or
manic-depressive-should put to rest any lingering question as to whether
Congress actually knew what it was doing when it drafted this law.




"Sanism 82 is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as
other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social
attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic bigotry.83 It infects both
and pyromania. It detracts from the principle underlying the Act that
such people were denied protection because of stereotypes, ignorance
and prejudice toward them and that their exclusion was permitted
primarily because they had no organized representation present during
the negotiations and no congressional champion arose to their defense.
Id. at 521.
80 Much of the material infra text accompanying notes 82-94 is adapted from Perlin,
Sanism, supra note 8, at 386-88, and Perlin and Dorfman, supra note 26, at 51-52. See also
Perlin, Sexual Interaction, supra note 30, at 534-39.
81 Much of the material infra text accompanying notes 95-102 is adapted from Perlin,
Pretexts, supra note 33, at 626-30. On the relationship between sanism and pretextuality,
see Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual
Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 N. ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994)
[hereinafter Perlin, Understanding].
82 The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum. See Morton Bimbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTALHEALTH CARE 97,106-07
(Frank J. Ayd ed., 1974); see Perlin, Competency, supra note 28, at 92-93 (discussing
Bimbaum's insights). Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as having first developed
and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for
institutionalized mental patients. See PERLIN, supra note 2, § 4.03 at 8-13 (discussing
Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46A.B.A.J. 499 (1960)). See also Koe v. Califano,
573 F.2d 761, 764 (2d. Cir. 1978) wherein the court recognized counsel's assertion that
there could be a "discriminatory attitude, perhaps unconscious, against the mentally ill."
The court further acknowledged that this attitude was characterized as "sanism." Id. at
n. 12.
Laura Mancuso, a staff member of the National Association of State Mental Health
Program Directors, has used the phrase "mentalism" to describe the same phenomenon.
L. Mancuso,"Psychiatric Disabilities: ADA Legal and Policy Options" (paper presented
at University of Pennsylvania Medical School Legal and Ethical Issues Conference,
October 1992, Philadelphia, PA) (notes on presentation on file with author).
83 The classic study is GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). On the
way that sanism incorporates a multi-step "prejudice assimilation model," see Keri A.
Gould, Madness in the Streets" Rides the Waves of Sanism, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 567,
574-81 (1992) (reviewing Rael J. Isaac & Virginia C. Armat, MADNESS IN THE STREETS:
How PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990)).
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our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism is largely invisible and
largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth,
superstition and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our
use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning in an
unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
Judges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural
presuppositions that engulf us all,"84 they express discomfort with social
science 85 (or any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony
over society) and skepticism about new thinking. This discomfort and
skepticism allows judges to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and
flawed, non-reflective OCS, both of which perpetuate the myths and
stereotypes of sanism. 86
2. Sanism and the Court Process in Mental Disability Law Cases
Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community and
their judicial decisions, in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law,
continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 87 Their language
demonstrates bias against individuals with mental disabilities88 and contempt
84Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 329, 332 (1991).
85Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 31, at 59-61; Perlin, Morality, supra note 33, at
133-37.
The discomfort that judges often feel in having todecidemental disability law cases
is often palpable. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent To Decide Competency
Questions? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957,
991 (1990) (court's characterization in Charters, 863 F.2d 302,310 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), of judicial involvement in right to refuse antipsychotic
medication cases as "'already perilous'.., reflects the court's almost palpable discomfort
in having to confront the questions before it.").
86 Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 31, at 61-69; Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 68, at
618-30.
87 See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 400-04. For recent examples of nonsanist
opinions, see Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (trial court's failure to determine
need for continued administration of antipsychotic medications to insanity pleading
defendant or to make inquiry about reasonable alternatives violated defendant's liberty
interest in freedom from such drugs; conviction reversed); Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S.
Ct. 1780 (1992) (statute that permits continued hospitalization of insanity acquittee
found to be no longer mentally ill violates due process); see generally infra text
accompanying notes 155-63.
88 See,e.g., Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516,1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Shuler
v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic"); Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d
549,569 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (court's charge to the jury stated
that "a person shall be considered of sound mind who is [not] a lunatic"); Pyle v. Boles,
250 F. Supp. 285,288 n.3 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (defendant's contention in writ of error was
that "trial judge showed his prejudice when he accused the petitioner of 'being crazy'.
..."); Brown v. People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ill. 1956) (judge asked defendant, 'You
are not crazy at this time, are you?") but cf. State v. Penner, 772 P.2d 819 (unpublished
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for the mental health professions. 89 Courts often appear impatient with litigants
who are mentally disabled, ascribing their problems in the legal process to
weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a popular sanist myth is that "[mlentally
disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to
their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint."90
Rarely, if ever, is behavioral or scientific authority cited to support sanist
opinions. At least one court, without citation to any authority, has found that
it is less likely that medical patients will "fabricate descriptions of their
complaints" than will "psychological patients."91 Another court has likened the
accuracy inherent in psychiatric predictivity of future dangerousness to
predictions made by an oncologist as to consequences of an untreated and
metastasized malignancy.92 This unsubstantiated analysis made in spite of the
opinion) reported at 1989 Kan. Lexis 66 (Kan. 1989), at "1, 6, 8 (witnesses admonished
not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
Judges also regularly and readily ignore evidence that jurors may share these same
biases. Compare, e.g., Moore v. State, 525 So.2d 870, 871 (Fla. 1988) (juror who rejected
insanity defense as potential basis for exculpatory criminal defense not excused for
cause) and Noe v. State, 586 So.2d 371, 375-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), with Boblett v.
Commonwealth, 396 S.E.2d 131,135-36 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (noabuseof discretionwhere
trial court refused to excuse for cause juror who indicated he might have difficulty
voting for an insanity acquittal).
89See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605, 612 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as '"eadshrinkers"); compare
State v. Percy, 507A.2d 955, 956 n.1 (Vt. 1986), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991) (conviction
reversed where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as
"psycho-babble") with Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not
error where prosecutor referred to defendant's expert witnesses as "a little head
specialist" and a "wizard").
On the other hand, the most minimalist lay testimony as to sanity is frequently
privileged. See, e.g., Exparte Milteer, 571 So.2d 998,999 (Ala. 1990), (trial judge permitted
warehouse supervisor witness who spoke on one occasion to defendant for two minutes
to testify that defendant "was sane"); State v. Van Horn, 528 So.2d 529,530 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (lay witnesses's testimony could provide "probative perceptions of
[defendant's] normalcy') (reversing trial court order entering judgment of not guilty by
reason of insanity).
90 Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 396; see also e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of
Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors,
"if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his own fault"); State v.
Duckworth, 496 So.2d 624,635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (juror who felt defendant would be
responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for cause); K.
Gould, I. Keilitz & J. Martin, Criminal Defendants With Trial Disabilities: The Theory
and Practice of Competency Assistance, at 68 (unpublished manuscript on file with
Professor Keri Gould, University of Utah School of Law) (trial judge responding to
National Center for State Courts' survey indicated that, in his mind, defendants who
were incompetent to stand trial could have communicated with and understood their
attorneys "if they [had] only wanted").
91People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Mich. 1989).
92 1n re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 898 (D.C. 1991). But see Elyn R. Saks, Competency to
Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 989 (1991) ("while it might be bizarre for an
1993-94]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
overwhelming weight of clinical and behavioral literature which concludes
that psychiatrists are far more often incorrect in predicting dangerousness than
they are accurate. 93 Yet another court has rejected expert testimony on a
homicide defendant's reactions to fear and stress on the grounds that such
emotions are "experienced by all mankind" and were thus not related to any
body of scientific knowledge.94
Sanist thinking allows judges to avoid difficult choices in mental disability
law cases. Their reliance on non-reflective, self-referential alleged "ordinary
common sense" contributes further to the pretextuality that underlies much of
this area of the law. Until and unless we confront the existence and extent of
this sort of judicial behavior, it is doubtful that the ADA's lofty promises will
ever become a reality.
B. Pretextuality
The entire relationship between the legal process and litigants with mental
disabilities is often pretextual. By this I mean simply that courts accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty, and engage similarly in
dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision making, specifically where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."95 This pretextuality
is poisonous. Its toxin infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds
cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces
shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt
testifying. The reality is well known to frequent consumers of judicial services
in this area: to mental health advocates and other public defender/legal
aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and criminal
defendants who are mentally disabled, to prosecutors and state attorneys
assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such cases, to
expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the person with a mental
disability involved in the litigation in question.
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in
the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact-
oncologist to deny the existence of cancer, some noted psychiatrists deny the very
existence of mental illness").
93 See generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 68, at 693-96, citing sources; see, e.g., JOHN
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTIONOF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); John Monahan, Risk
Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge, 11
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1989); Richard Rogers & Elizabeth Lynett, The Role of
Canadian Psychiatry in Dangerous Offender Testimony, 36 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 79 (1991);
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984).
94Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Wyo. 1987).
95Perlin, Morality, supra note 33, at 133; e.g., Charles M. Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule
and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 840 (1974).
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finders.96 Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own
self-referential concepts of "morality"97 and openly subvert statutory and case
law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for
commitment 98 or that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an
"incompetent to stand trial" finding.99 Often this testimony is further warped
by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses, like the rest of us, succumb to the
meretricious allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking. As a
result they employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution
theory in their testimony.10 0 This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by
frequently sanist fact-finders. 101 Judges and jurors, both consciously and
unconsciously, often rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their
decision making thus subordinating statutory and case law standards as well
as the legitimate interests of persons with mental disabilities who are the
subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same sorts of
heuristic bias as exhibited by expert witnesses further contaminate the
process.102
This combination of sanist experts and courts helps define a system in which
(1) dishonest testimony is often regularly (and unthinkingly) accepted; (2)
statutory and case law standards are frequently subverted; and (3)
insurmountable barriers are raised to insure that the allegedly "therapeutically
correct" social end is met and that the worst-case-disaster-fantasy, the false
96See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (although
District of Columbia code contained provision that patient could invoke to seek periodic
review of commitment or independent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since passage
of relevant statute, not a single patient exercised the right to statutory review). The
significance of Streicher is discussed carefully in Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned But Not
Forgotten: The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991-92).
97See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is Fair:" Rape
Shield Laws and Officials'Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 139
(1991) ("a [legal] reform that contradicts deeply held beliefs may result either in open
defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law"); accord H. RICHARD
UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 116-18(1988) (police sanction perjury in cases where Supreme
Court has imposed constitutional rules that do not comport with officers' "own idea of
fairplay"); see also Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution from the Backseat ofa Police Squad
Car 70 B.U. L. REv. 543, 580-82(1990) (reviewing UVILLER, supra) (criticizing view).
9 8 See, e.g., Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 33, at 664-46.
99 See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. App. 1985) (expert testified
that defendant was "out in left field" and went "bananas").
10OSee generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 31; Saks & Kidd, supra note 32.
101See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 7.13 at 617-23; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
26.
102 See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 33.
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negative, is avoided 103 In short, the mental disability law system often
deprives individuals of liberty disingenuously and upon bases that have no
relationship to case law or to statutes.
Pretextual devices such as condonation of perjured testimony, distorted
readings of trial testimony, subordination of statistically significant social
science data, and enactment of prophylactic civil rights laws that have
absolutely no "real world" impact similarly dominate the mental disability law
landscape. Utilization of these devices usually flows from the same motives
that inspire similar behavior by courts and legislatures in other cases. Again,
we must consider the impact of this pretextual decision making on the ultimate
value and utility of the ADA.
IV. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY AND THE ADA
A. Introduction
My discussion so far has dealt with the ADA's treatment (or non-treatment)
of persons with mental disability and the negative ways that sanism and
pretextuality generally affect such persons. The legislative history creates a
strong record about both the debilitating impact of stigma and the harm done
by stereotyped perceptions of mental disability, and makes it fairly clear that
these issues were in the minds of the Act's drafters. 10 4 Yet, there is little in the
ADA that speaks directly to discriminatory acts against persons with mental
disabilities.1 05
Nonetheless, as to matters of employment and as to accommodations, the
ADA has the potential capacity be an extraordinarily important enforcement
tool. If the Act is construed as Congress apparently intended, employers will
no longer be able to ask questions about prior mental health treatment on job
application forms;1' 6 no longer will towns be able to exclude formerly
10 3 1.e., when a person predicted to be non-dangerous subsequently commits a violent
act. On predictions of dangerousness in this context generally, see I PERLIN, supra note
2, §§ 2.14-2.16 at 116-39.
104For a range of thoughtful and sensitive Congressional commentary on the Act that
recognizes the role of social attitudes in shaping behavior, see 136 CONG. REc. H2421-02
(May 17,1990) (comments of Rep. Luken, Rep. Lowey, Rep. Anderson, Rep. Mineta and
Rep. Matsui).
105Interestingly, following the passage of theADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was
amended in part to, at least, better complement the ADA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 701(b)(1)(A),(C),(F) (Supp. 1994). In discussing the scope of required "on-going
support services," the committee report on that Act notes specifically that an individual
with severe mental illness may not want his or her job coach to come to the job site
because of the present stigma in our society towards individuals with disabilities
"because of fear [of] the reactions of co-workers to the knowledge of his or her mental
illness." H.R. REP. No. 822, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1992, 1992 WL 202382, WESTLAW
pagination at 278.
106 See, e.g. Renee Ravid, Disclosure of Mental Illness to Employers: Legal Recourses and
Ramifications, 20J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 85 (1992) (employerscan only inquireintojob-related
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institutionalized persons from access to local services;107 no longer will we be
faced with the grotesque story of the zookeeper who denied access to a group
of mentally handicapped schoolchildren "because they upset the
chimpanzees."108
Having a job and a place to live are the two key variables that serve to
separate those ex-patients who can permanently stay out of hospitals and live
a decent life from those who face the revolving door or life in back alleys.109
The ADA's focus on employment issues can be read hand-in-glove with the
1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act (FIAA)110 which underscore
Congress' understanding of the importance of work and housing to disabled
persons.11t As the first generation of ADA litigation emerges, the general public
may finally begin to see deinstitutionalization as a success story rather than as
a social disaster.11 2 These potentially ameliorative changes strike me as the sorts
of changes that the drafters of the ADA hoped for (at least on an unconscious
level).
There is little evidence, however, that the drafters paid serious attention to
many of the unique dilemmas faced by persons with mental disabilities,
especially as they relate to questions of institutionalization. The visually
graphic negative images of persons with mental disabilities-the deranged
criminal who "beats the rap" through a meretricious insanity defense;113 the
functions); see also Rosalind Resnick, Groups Criticize Bar On Mental Histories, NAT'L L.J.
(May 18, 1992), at 3 (discussing Florida ACLU challenge to questions on bar exam
application about candidate's psychiatric history and experiences in therapy).
10 7See, e.g., Cook, supra note 9, at 415; Tucker, supra note 4 at 16-17.
108Tucker, supra note 4, at 17.
109 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602,3604 (Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988).
t1 OSee generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 6.44B at 131-36 (Supp. 1994).
111The goals of the FHAA were to secure to people with disabilities the right to
establish a home free of discrimination in any community they choose, and to integrate
persons of disability into the mainstream of American life. See Simring, supra note 24,
at 420; PHILIP Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNEs 181-86
(1989) (clearly and explicitly discussing the relationship of housing issues to
homelessness); James Hogan, Community Housing Rights for the Mentally Retarded, 1987
DEr. C. L. REV. 869, 897-909 (discussing the relationship between community-based
housing and the future of deinstitutionalization). See also Michael L. Perlin, The Right to
Voluntary, Compensated Therapeutic Work As Part of the Right to Treatment: A New Theory
in the Aftermath ofSouder, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 298,314-19 (1976) (citing sources on the
meaning of work and the way it motivates, empowers and enhances self-esteem); 2
PERLIN, supra note 2, § 6.17 at 481-88.
112See generally Perlin, Competency, supra note 28 (discussing strategies to ensure
successful implementation of deinstitutionalization policies). On the gap between
deinstitutionalization perceptions and realities, see id. at 94-108.
113See Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 68, at 713-21. To some, it may not matter whether
the insanity plea is real or is feigned. See Gilbert Gels & Robert F. Meier, Abolition of the
Insanity Defense in Idaho: A Case Study, 477 ANNALS 72, 73 (1985) (Idaho residents
concluded that criminal defendants who have a mental disability should not be able to
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deinstitutionalized homeless person released from hospitals because of the
legal legerdemain of naive civil libertarian lawyersnl4-- create additional
burdens-and social handicaps for all persons with mental disabilities. Indeed,
the Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones, holding that convictedfelons had
a liberty interest entitling them to a due process hearing prior to involuntary
civil commitment to a mental hospital, 115 was premised in large part on its
finding that the adverse social consequences of commitment, including social
stigma, that flow from such commitment can have a "very significant impact
on the individual."116 The existence of a link between institutionalization and
stigma in this context is not unknown to the Supreme Court.117
Further, with one prominent exception, 118 there has been virtually no
scholarly consideration of the ADA's ultimate impact on the status of
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities. The legislative history
speaks eloquently and movingly about the debilitating and permanently
crippling impact caused by segregation of minorities119 and notes
appropriately that separate can never be equal. 120 However, the inevitable
question begs to be asked: What impact does this history-when taken
together with the antidiscrimination language of Title 11121 and the Carolene
Products/equal protection language of the initial findings122-have on the
future legitimacy of involuntary institutionalization?
avoid punitive consequences of criminal acts by reliance on either a "real or faked plea
of insanity").
114 See, e.g., Perlin, Competency, supra note 28, at 86-88; Douglas Mossman & Michael
L. Perlin, Psychiatry and the Homeless Mentally Ill: A Reply to Dr. Lamb, 149 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 951, 951 (1992).
115445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980).
1161d. at 492, quoting, in part, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979). On
stigma in involuntary civil commitment in general, see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
117See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429 ("One who is suffering from a debilitating mental
illness and in need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma.").
118See infra text accompanying notes 123-40.
119 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485 (MII), supra note 63, WESTLAW pagination at *80:
'Integration is fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provision of segregated
accommodations and services relegate persons with disabilities to second-class citizen
status."
120 See, e.g., Cook, supranote9,at 423-25 (quoting statements by members of Congress).
121See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990) which states "[N]o qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity."
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), (b)(4) (1990), discussed supra text accompanying notes
6-11; see also, Allan Macurdy, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Time for Celebration, or
Time for Caution? 1 B. U. PUB. INT. LJ. 21, 29 (1991) ("It must be said with great clarity
and fervor that the ADA is a vehicle for the enforcement of disability-based violations
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In the first major analytic piece discussing the specific impact of the ADA on
persons with mental disabilities, the late Tmothy CookI23 was explicit: he saw
the title as ending the segregation of institutions for the mentally disabled. 12 4
He read Congressional intent, as expressed in the Act's legislative history, to
abolish the "monoliths of isolated care in institutions and in segregated
educational settings ... [as] separate is not equal. It was not for blacks; it is not
for the disabled."125 He found the House Judiciary Report to be equally explicit:
"Integration is fundamental to the purposes of the ADA. Provisions of
segregated accommodations and services relegate persons with disabilities to
second-class citizen status."126 The Act, according to Cook, barred both
intentional and unintentional discrimination. 127 A consensus of social science
research supported this bar, he argued, finding that "institutions and other
segregated settings are simply unacceptable.' 128 Further, according to Cook,
the Act's invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment effectively overrules the
"substantial professional judgment" standard set down in Youngberg v.
Romeo.129
Cook's arguments raise difficult questions. Most of his supporting sources
deal with research done in cases involving persons who were mentally retarded
or developmentally disabled.130 Can the same arguments be made about
individuals who are mentally ill? Do police power considerations inherent in
the involuntary civil commitment process131 create a meaningful distinction?
Does the invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the use of "discrete and
insular minority" language elsewhere in the Act's introduction significantly
alter the Youngberg standard? Has the Supreme Court subsequently opened
up a slight fissure in the Youngberg standard in an entirely different context in
of the Equal Protection Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment."), butcf. id. at37 (reporting
on a conversation in which former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh rejects the
argument that the ADA legislatively overrules the Supreme Court's holding in the
Cleburne case).
123 Before his death, Cook was head of the National Disability Action Center. Cook,
supra note 9, at 393.
124 d. at 429.
1251d. at 423 (quoting Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearing before the Senate Comm.
on Laborand Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
215 (1989) (statement of former Sen. Weicker)).
126Cook, supra note 9, at 424 (quoting 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 449.)
1271d. at 427.
1281d. at 413, citing sources.
129457 U.S. 307(1982); Cook, supra note 9, at 466. This aspect of Youngberg is discussed
in 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 4.35.
130Cook, supra note 9, at 442-48.
131 See generally I PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 2.06-2.07 at 64-73.
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Riggins v. Nevada132 when it seemed to suggest that "least restrictive alternative"
concepts-banished from the Court's methodology after Youngberg-were
pertinent in the context of drugging inquiries at a criminal trial? What
application would Cook's theory have to the institutionalization of criminal
defendants with mental disabilities following, say, a finding of permanent
incompetency to stand trial133 or the successful proffering of an insanity
defense?134
These are difficult questions for which there are no ready or apparent easy
answers. Taken to its next step, Cook's thesis would also call into question the
constitutionality of each state's involuntary civil commitment statutes.135 The
time has long passed since the day when commitment abolitionists appeared
to be amassing support for their efforts. 136 A pendulum swing137 has resulted
in a call for expanded commitment powers in many jurisdictions.138 It now
appears that the perceived linkages between involuntary civil commitment
requirements and homelessness make it likely that the time of the abolition
movement has come and gone.139 Can, or should, the ADA be used to support
132112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); see Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 26, at 57-58 (discussing
Riggins).
133Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Supreme Court held that it violated
due process to commit an individual awaiting trial for more than the "reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
attain that capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable future." Id. at 738. If there was no
such substantial chance, then the state would be forced to initiate civil commitment
proceedings against the individual or release him from custody. Id.
134 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (upholding District of Columbia
post-insanity acquittal commitment statute); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780
(1992) (striking down Louisiana post-insanity acquittal commitment statute that
allowed for the continued confinement of potentially dangerous but not mentally ill
insanity acquittees).
13 5 See generally I PERLIN, supra note 2, at §§ 2.01-2.28.
13 61d. § 2.24. In 1978, President Carter's Commission on Mental Health's Task Force
Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues recommended a "modified abolition" position. Id.§ 2.26 at 172-75.
13 7See, e.g., Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy
Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 395, 398 (1985); Daniel W. Shuman, Innovative Statutory Approaches to Civil
Commitment: An Overview and Critique, 13 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 284, 286 (1985).
138See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2.27A at 47-49 (Supp. 1994).
139Recently, H. Richard Lamb, organized psychiatry's most visible critic of
deinstitutionalization, has called for a moratorium on future deinstitutionalization
programs. H. Richard Lamb, Is It Timefora Moratorium on Deinstitutionalization? 43 HosP.
& CoMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 669 (1992). Cf. Mossman & Perlin, supra note 114 (generally
criticizing Lamb's views).
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Cook's arguments? If it could, would we expect to see the efforts to repeal the
ADA intensified?140
A recent review of a book of essays analyzing the ADA characterized the
statute as "the Rip Van Winkle of civil rights legislation."14 1 If Cook's arguments
are taken up by litigators and successfully urged on courts in impact and law
reform contexts, we can expect that statutory based disability rights litigation
will necessarily emerge from dormancy.
B. The Relationship Between the ADA, Stigma and Pretextuality
Any analysis of Cook's arguments must be undertaken contextually in light
of my prior discussion of sanism and pretextuality. Mental disability law has
traditionally been premised on sanist grounds. Bias and stereotype have led to
sanist decision making which is reflected in many ways. For example, vivid
individual cases--no matter how idiosyncratic-regularly "trump" volumes of
empirical study, and social science data is used and misused for teleological
ends, that is, in accordance with and in adherence to previously determined
ultimate conclusions. When faced with non-sanist statutes or judicial decisions,
courts frequently resort to pretextual decision making, often abetted by
pretextual testimony that is often consciously and openly rationalized by a
sense of a "higher morality."142
The "direct threat" language in the ADA 143 is a potential laboratory for sanist
and pretextual experimentation. What sort of "behavior" will allegedly pose
such a threat? If an employee starts to discuss obscure political conspiracies, is
that a threat? If an individual taking psychotropic medication develops side
effects that create an agitated or a "zombie-like" condition, is that a threat? If
an employee appears to be fixated with, say, frogs or turtles, and talks to
customers about their importance to the world, is that a threat? To what extent
can we expect that employers will tolerate 144 "aberrant" behavior on the part
of workers? Let one local news station pick up a story that a group of school
children stopped going to a downtown luncheonette because an employee was
"acting odd," and that anecdote will become the centerpiece of the next debate
on amending the ADA.
If the plain language of the ADA conflicts with what trial judges think is
"best" for persons with mental disabilities, will judges enter pretextual
decisions (and encourage pretextual testimony)? Michael Saks has reported on
140 See infra note 167.
141Parmet, supra note 26, at 583.
14 2 See generally Perlin, Morality, supra note 33; Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 33, at 640-59.
143 See supra text accompanying note 45.
1441 use the word consciously. It is impossible to assess the ADA's ultimate impact
without some consideration of the value of "tolerance." See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting
Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, 28 OscOODE HALL L.J. 409 (1990); Steven
D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1990).
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a trial judge's explanation as to why he has ordered civil commitment of
individuals notwithstanding his overt acknowledgement that the state failed
to meet its burden of proof. The judge did so because he felt compelled "to do
what ... [he thought was] right."145 Should we expect judges to be less
pretextual in ADA decision making?
Interestingly, in at least one section, the ADA drafters seem to acknowledge
the dangers of pretexts. While the Act explicitly does not restrict the ability of
insurance companies to limit mental illness disability benefits, 146 it specifies
that this non-restriction section may not be used as a "subterfuge" to evade the
purposes of either the employment or public accommodations titles.147 This
expectation of pretextual behavior on the part of an industry subject to
regulation under this Act is both realistic and troubling for it reflects the extent
to which pretexts can color the way we treat persons with mental disability.
The potential superimposition of "morality" has already been raised
explicitly in the floor debate by Senator Helms. His revealing
comment-questioning the potential consequences if an employer's "moral
standards" prevent him from hiring a manic-depressive 148 -reflects the reality
that sanist behavior may be seen as moral behavior. Will this lead to a spate of
literature suggesting that the ADA be subverted in the same way that
psychiatrists have written articles suggesting that strict involuntary civil
commitment laws be subverted?149
I have suggested in prior papers that one of the many reasons why society
reacts differently toward mentally disabled persons than when it discriminates
against other minorities is because the distinguishing characteristics of the
latter groups, such as race, are frequently immutable.15 0 With rare exceptions,
people do not change gender. These people, however, do so knowingly. When
individuals change religion, it is generally a voluntary act undertaken with
some knowledge of the dimensions and consequences of the decision. On the
other hand, each one of us can become mentally ill (and none of us chooses it
145 Michael Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAw
& Hum. BEHAV. 291, 293 (1990), discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 26, at 54.
14642 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(1) (1990).
14 71d. § 12201(c); see generally Ramage, supra note 69.
148 See supra text accompanying note 76.
149 See generally, Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 33, at 644-52, and 1 PERLIN, supra note 2,
§ 2.23A at 42-46 (Supp. 1994), citing and discussing, inter alia, Paul Chodoff, The Casefor
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 496, 501 (1976); Paul
Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY William McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to
the Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 715, 717 (1981).
15oCf.James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions ofJudges Scalia,
Bork, Posner, Easterbrookand Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1171,1198-99 (1986) (discussing
Justice Scalia's rejection of the immutability argument in equal protection challenge to
constitutionality of post-insanity acquittal commitment statute in United States v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 128,134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
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volitionally). This phenomenon may help explain the level of virulence we
often show toward persons with mental disabilities. 151
The ADA floor debate on this question of what I will call the
"non-immutability of mental illness" was illuminating. Senator Armstrong
made this point graphically in his arguments on behalf of a narrowed law:
A person is or is not a man or a woman; A person is or is not a
Catholic, a Jew, a Mormon, whatever .... That is something we can
readily determine. A person either is or is not Irish, Italian and so on.
This bill proceeds from an entirely different point of view .... 152
On the other hand, Senator Domenici, a co-sponsor and ardent supporter, used
the same information in an entirely different context. Said Domenici:
It is very simple to say that it is only a matter of sex discrimination
and perhaps race and perhaps religion, as some have suggested. Those
are easy ones.
But they just scratch the surface in terms of the suffering that goes
on in the lives of people who are assumed to be disabled because of
some of the niches that the' are put in, especially when it comes to
serious mental illness .... 1.7
Our discomfort and lack of clarity as to who, exactly, is disabled, and who is
not is, at best, sanist. Just as we wish to be able to categorize individuals in the
criminal law as sane or insane, competent or incompetent,154 we wish for a
"real world" without tinges and shades of gray, especially on the question of
who is "mentally disabled" for purposes of an act such as the ADA.
This analysis is not entirely informed by pessimism. The enormity of the
badge of stigma is finally becoming clear to at least a handful of judges.
151 See Perlin, Competency, supra note 28, at 93 n.174; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 26,
at 48 n.3. On the way that public fears about the purported link between mental illness
and dangerousness "drive the formal laws and policies governing mental disability
jurisprudence," see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and
Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992). On the ways that stereotypes pervade
our views of disabled persons, see Macurdy, supra note 122, at 32-34.
152135 CONG. REc. S10,765 (dailey ed. Sept. 7, 1989), WESTLAW pagination at 64
(remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
153Id. at 112 (remarks of Sen. Domenici).
154 See generally Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 68, at 640-706. On the multiple meanings
of competency, see Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 33, at 640-59; Bruce Winick, Competency to
Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v.
Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 83, 102-05 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS]. Fora recent illustrative case, seeKoehlerv. State,
830 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (determination of incompetence to manage one's
own affairs not a prima facie showing of incompetency to stand trial). But see Godinez
v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) (no difference in constitutional standard for determining
competency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty).
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Concurring in a recent holding that an appeal from an involuntary civil
commitment order was not mooted solely by the individual's release from
hospitalization, Florida Supreme Court Judge Gerald Kogan revealed his
understanding of the role of sanism in mental disability law: "The law itself is
beginning a process of rooting out acts of irrational prejudice based on mental
disability, just as the law in the 1960's began eliminating the irrational bigotry
posed by racism."155
Other, more well-known opinions have been written in the same voice.Judge
Frank Johnson's Wyatt v. Stickney decisions 156 are firmly rooted in a
rights/empowerment model.157 Opinions such as Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Barefoot v. Estelle158 or the New Jersey Supreme Court's majority opinion in
State v. Krol159 rebut sanist myths. Other jurists, such as Justice Stevens'
dissenting in Pennhurst 11160 and Justices Stevens' and Marshall's separate
opinions in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,161 express eloquent
outrage at institutional conditions that flow from sanist social attitudes. Still
others, most notably Judge Stanley Brotman's second trial court opinion in
Rennie v. K/ein,162 express true empathy and understanding about the plight of
155Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211, 215 (Ha. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
156See generally 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 87 (M.D. Ala. 1973);
344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972); 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); (finding
broad-based constitutional right to treatment).
157See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 131-45 (1990) (discussing a rights based theory to
acquire needed services for persons who have a mental impairment).
158463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (dissenting from decision upholding death penalty in case
involving psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness at capital sentencing phase).
159344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975) (applying broad procedural and substantive due process
protections to post-insanity acquittal commitment proceedings); cf. Jones v. United
States, 463 US. 354 (1983) (upholding as constitutional District of Columbia statute
providing far fewer such protections).
16 0Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 126 (1984) (dissenting
from decision that Eleventh Amendment bars pendent state claims in federal court
against state officials seeking right to establish least restrictive alternative treatment in
community settings).
161473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring), and id. at 455 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). See supra note 9.
162476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (establishing broad constitutionally based right to
refuse antipsychotic drug treatment). The court stated that:
Medicine has not yet found a cure for the terrible pain of mental illness.
The law cannot assist in this endeavor. But the constitution can and does
prevent those who have suffered so much at the hands of nature from
being subjected to further suffering at the hands of man.
Id. at 1309.
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individuals institutionalized because of mental disability.163 Yet, these views
represent only a clear minority. Judicial decisions in all areas of mental
disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. 164 These
myths are "cherished by trial judges, appellate judges, and Supreme Court
justices, especially by the Chief Justice of the United States."165
V. CONCLUSION
The question must be recast. To what extent might our sanist practices and
pretextual judicial system potentially eviscerate the plain language of the
ADA? Let me offer a few interrelated answers. First, if social attitudes are not
changed, I am pessimistic about the ADA's ultimate impact on the fabric of our
society. If individual employers, restaurant owners, transit system managers,
shopkeepers, and bureaucrats adhere to sanist's beliefs, they will inevitably
resist the implementation of the ADA. If there is such resistance, the enormous
transactional and social costs of the inevitable implementing litigation will
drain money, time, and resources from the disability rights community at an
alarming rate.166
Even in a best case model (where clean facts are presented with a
litigationally attractive plaintiff and a fairly clear statutory violation), the
danger of pretextual decision making can never be minimized. If fact-finders
insist on adhering to sanist myths (as part of their reliance onfaux OCS), then
much of the ADA's potential value will be blunted. Second, if Cook's analysis
of Title II is correct, then the ADA calls for the most important
transformation-ever--of public mental health care. If litigators attempt to
implement his theory, how will judges respond? Perhaps, more importantly,
how will Congress respond? Legislation has already been introduced in
Congress to repeal the ADA. 167 Will other members join this effort?
Third, on whom can we rely to bring litigation to implement and enforce the
ADA? Globally, the quality of representation afforded to persons with mental
disabilities has traditionally been substandard. 168 Notwithstanding the fears
expressed by the business community-about the ADA generating "full
16 3 nterestingly, the trial testimony of defendants' employees and witnesses in Rennie
revealed that antipsychotic medications were often administered in state hospitals for
pretextual reasons. See id. at 1299 (medical director of defendant institution
acknowledged that medication was used "as a form of control and as a substitute for
treatment").
16 4 Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 400-04 (listing examples).
16 5 1d. at 401, citing, inter alia, Perlin, Unpacking, supra note 68, at 711-31; Perlin,
Psychodynamics, supra note 31, at 61-69 (discussing cases).
16 6 0n the significance of the non-self-executability of rights in mental disability law,
see Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 32, at 47-49, discussing, inter alia, Bruce Winick,
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 921, 941 (1985).
16 7 See, e.g., H.R. 5450, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (by Rep. Edwards).
16 8 See generally Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 32, at 49-54.
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employment... for lawyers"169-I am pessimistic about the opportunities that
disabled persons will have to gain access to competent, committed counsel in
this area. Without such access the words of the ADA may prove hollow.
Fourth, how will the public react if there is a single incident of violence
committed by an individual with a mental disability toward a stranger with
whom he came into contact as a result of enforcement of an ADA provision?
The way that a single vivid case can shape (or misshape) legislative policies in
the mental disability area is well known,170 especially when it involves a
stranger-stranger crime. 171 It does not take a Hollywood scriptwriter to conjure
up Senator Helms' subsequent salvos on the Senate floor.
Fifth, what sort of meaningful public education effort will be undertaken?
For behavior to change, attitudes must change. Education is clearly a first step,
but abstract knowledge is not enough.172 Public service announcements on
radio and television will not and cannot, by themselves alone, eradicate
centuries of sanist behavior. In another paper about sanism, I made a
suggestion which is equally applicable here: "[We all must] bear witness to
sanist acts by colleagues, other professionals, the legal system, and the public
at large.... [We should] speak up-at the faculty lunch table, on the train, at
the bait and tackle shop-wherever and whenever sanist stereotypes are
employed." 173
Next, what is the role of the academy? In recent years, mental disability
scholars have been exceptionally creative and energetic in conceiving new
approaches to the study of this area of the law. The effort embarked upon by
David Wexler and Bruce Winick to study the therapeutic jurisprudential
implications of mental disability law is a monumental enterprise. 174 This effort
should be extended to the ADA. While it seems obvious to say that, at first
blush, the ADA is as therapeutic a law as one can imagine (as it focuses on
169 5ee supra note 19.
170 See generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 31; Donald Bersoff, Judicial Defrrence
to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive
Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 329 (1992).
171See, e.g., William Fisher, et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil Commitment Statutes? 39
Hosp. & CoMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 711 (1988).
172 For the classic example, see Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil
Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope With Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1,
15 (1978), discussed in Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 32, at 52 n.74 (training lawyers
in substantive mental health topics did not materially affect their court performance
because their attitudes did not change).
173 Perlin, Sanism, supra note 8, at 407.
174 5ee, e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David
B. Wexler ed., 1990); ESSAYS, supra note 154; David Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into
Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992). See
generally, Perlin, Understanding, supra note 81; Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HuM. Rrs. 623 (1993); 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 1.05A, at
6-13 (Supp. 1994); PERLIN, supra note 4, § 5.01, at 661-63.
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ability, not disability, and sets out a blueprint for social, political and cultural
change), more thoughtful and complete analyses are needed. Other scholars
who write about "psychological jurisprudence," such as Gary Melton, begin
with the fundamental assumption that the purpose of law is to "promote
human welfare."Th Studies from a psychological perspective of the ways in
which the ADA accomplishes this would be beneficial to persons with mental
disabilities, the businesses and public entities regulated by the ADA,
legislators, and members of the judiciary.
Finally, once "Rip Van Winkle" is awakened, 176 how will Congress respond?
In speaking against the ADA, Senator Humphrey referred to it as "one of the
most radical pieces of legislation" he had encountered in his eleven years in the
U.S. Senate.1 77 I believe that he was right, but with entirely the wrong spin. If
the ADA does force a change in our social attitudes, then it will work a
fundamental change in our social fabric. It will force us to reevaluate centuries
of discrimination, bigotry and prejudice. Such a change will also force us to
acknowledge that persons with disabilities, whether persons with mental
disabilities, persons with mental illnesses, or persons who were previously
institutionalized for mental illnesses, are full citizens of this country. Only then
will it be recognized that they, like all other citizens, deserve to be treated "as
human beings."178 That thought would be radical, indeed.
175Gary B. Melton, The Law Is a Good Thing (Psychology Is, Too): Human Rights in
Psychological Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 381, 383 (1992).
17 6 See supra text accompanying note 140.
177135 CONG. REc. S10,765 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1989), WESTLAW pagination at 135. Cf.
Macurdy, supra note 122, at 24 ("For us, the potential change in our legal position is no
less revolutionary than for... people of color after President Johnson signed the 1964
[Civil Rights] Act.")
178Falter v. Veterans' Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178,1185 (D.N.J. 1980).
1993-94]

